Lawrence Mitchell’s output is not limited to books alone. His thoughts have been published in several different magazines, in both article and chapter form. Listed below is only a small sample of the many publications Lawrence has made outside of full books:
Gentleman’s Agreement: The Antisemitic Origins of Restrictions on Stockholder Litigation, 36 Queen’s Law Journal 71 (2010)
This article delves into the circumstances under which the first security-for-expense statute was adopted in 1944 by New York, using it as an example to show that seemingly innocuous legislation can originate in bigotry and prejudice
Financialism: A Brief History, in THE EMBEDDED CORPORATION (Cynthia A. Williams and Peer Zumbansen, eds.:Cambridge University Press; 2010)
Aimed at describing various financial, economic, and legal developments in the USA between the years of 1952 and 2007, this article argues that they combine to transform the American economic system from capitalism into a process called Financialism that strips future economic profits for present consumption, leading to unsustainable capitalism and intergenerational inequity.
Toward a New Law and Economics: The Case of the Stock Market, (in circulation; available on SSRN.com) (2010)
This text exemplifies a new perspective toward the examination of the role of the U.S. public equity markets, and ultimately suggests that their part in real economic growth is extremely limited. Mitchell’s research and logic break down a political facade that has misled many for generations.
The Financial Determinants of Corporate Governance (with Dalia T. Mitchell), in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (H. Kent Baker and Ronald Anderson, eds; John Wiley & Sons; 2010)
This powerfully insightful chapter, published together with similar excerpts, is a base level exploration of the interdependence of finance and corporate governance, demonstrating that the laws governing corporations primarily have developed to satisfy the needs of those who finance them. Mitchell worries that such a unidirectional development leads to legal and economic disregard of other stakeholders who depend upon corporations.
The Legitimate Rights of Public Shareholders 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1635 (2010) (selected for republication in Corporate Practice Commentator, R. Thompson, ed.)
Recently, an academic debate covering the right of expanding the public shareholders’ participation in corporate governance has split many politicians into fractured parties. The debate has accompanied a dramatic increase in institutional shareholder and hedge fund activism attempting to influence the conduct of corporate affairs. Mitchell shows that public stockholders largely have been irrelevant in financing productive corporate activity.